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We develop a multi-market equilibrium displacement model that allows for demand linkages 
(substitutes or complements) across downstream product markets, and supply linkages through 
the common use of a raw commodity as the key input.    Applying the model to the dairy sector, 
we find that the effectiveness of producer-funded advertising, and thus optimal advertising 
intensities, depends on the demand relationships across dairy product markets (cross-price and 
cross-advertising elasticities), as well as the re-allocation of raw milk towards the advertised 
market.    We argue that the previous literature, which ignores the horizontal linkages highlighted 
here, tends to overstate the effectiveness of generic commodity promotion for dairy, and thus 




Numerous studies have examined the effectiveness of producer-funded generic promotion 
for milk and for cheese (e.g., Blisard et al.; Kaiser 1997 and 1999; Kaiser and Chung; Liu and 
Forker; Schmit and Kaiser).    The typical analysis estimates econometric models of fluid milk or 
cheese demand as a function of own prices, prices of related goods, demographic characteristics, 
and generic advertising expenditure.    While empirical findings vary across studies and across 
products, promotion is typically found to generate positive and significant increases in demand, 
as well as large returns to producers’ investment.     
However, the typical approach, which models the market for the advertised product in 
isolation, is incapable of capturing the effects of commodity promotion on horizontally related 
markets (Alston, Freebairn and James; Piggott, Piggott, and Wright; Kinnucan; Kinnucan and 
Miao).    This omission is particularly crucial for analysis of dairy product promotion for two 
reasons.    First, individual dairy products are linked on the supply side through their common Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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use of milk components as key inputs.    Thus, an increase in demand for any given product will 
result not only in increased sales of raw milk, but also a reallocation of milk components across 
product markets.    Second, dairy product markets are arguably related on the demand side, so 
that prices and advertising for one product affect demand for other products. 
This paper develops an analytical, multi-market model of the dairy industry that captures 
these horizontal linkages across dairy product markets.    We apply the model to trace the 
economic effects of generic commodity promotion on markets for manufactured dairy products, 
the implicit markets for milk components, and the market for raw milk.    Comparative statics 
show that the effect of advertising on the price of raw milk depends on the horizontal supply and 
demand linkages across dairy product markets.    Further, we derive an expression for the 
optimal advertising expenditures for alternative dairy products.    A key result is that ignoring the 
horizontal relationships that link dairy product markets leads to an inflated estimate of the 
effectiveness of advertising, and thus too much advertising.    This is due to a “Beggar-Thy-Self” 
effect of advertising—since some dairy products are substitutes, increased demand for the 
advertised product comes, in part, at the expense of reduced demand for other dairy products. 
A key contribution of this paper is the extension of work by Alston, Freebairn, and James 
to link the markets for advertised products through supply, as well as demand.    This concept is 
applicable to other industries where a single commodity is allocated to multiple downstream Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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markets.    Examples may include the allocation of a farm commodity in alternative processed 
markets, processed vs. fresh markets, or foreign vs. domestic markets. 
In the next section, we present the model of dairy markets, and analyze the comparative 
static results.    In Section 3, we develop an optimal advertising rule, and illustrate the 
implications of ignoring the horizontal linkages across dairy product markets.    Section 4 
concludes and discusses future directions for research on this topic. 
2. A Multi-market Model of the U.S. Diary Industry 
2.1. A 2-component x 2-product model of the dairy industry 
We develop a Muth model of the U.S. dairy industry for the purpose of demonstrating 
analytically the role of linkages between related markets for determining the effects of generic 
promotion (Muth; Gardner; Alston, Norton, and Pardey).    To keep the exposition relatively 
simple, we specify a model with 2 components of raw milk (e.g., fat, solids-not-fat) used in the 
manufacture of 2 distinct dairy products (e.g., fluid milk and manufactured products) (see Alston 
et al. for a related, milk-components model of dairy markets).    Extension of the model to the n-
component-m-product model is straightforward.     
The model is written algebraically as follows: 
(1)  Raw milk supply       M = f(Wm) 
(2)  Milk fat supply        a = AM 
(3)  Milk snf supply        b = BM Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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(4)  Fluid product production    X1 = g1(a1,b1) 
(5)  Manufactured product production X2 = g2(a2,b2) 
(6)  Fluid product demand      X1 = D1(P1,P2,Z1,Z2) 
(7)  Manufactured product demand    X2 = D2(P1,P2,Z1,Z2) 
(8)  Milk fat pricing       g1aP1 = Wa 
(9)  Milk fat pricing       g2aP2 = Wa 
(10)  Milk snf pricing       g1bP1 = Wb 
(11)  Milk snf pricing       g2bP2 = Wb 
(12)  Milk pricing        Wm = AWa +BWb 
(13)  Milk fat adding up condition    a = a1 + a2 
(14)  Milk snf adding up condition      b = b1 + b2 
Equation (1) expresses the supply of raw milk, M, as a function of the pool price of raw 
milk.    Equations (2) and (3) express the (fixed proportions) production relation between milk 
components and raw milk, where A and B are the quantities of milk components per unit of milk.   
Equations (4) and (5) are the production functions for dairy products, Xi, for which fat and snf 
are inputs, and equations (6) and (7) are dairy product demand.    Demand for each dairy product 
is a function of prices for both products, P1 and P2, as well as advertising for both products, Z1 
and Z2.    Equations (8)-(11) express the competitive market equilibrium condition for milk 
components, that the price of each component is the equal to the value marginal product of that 
component in its alternative uses (subscript a or b on the production functions indicate the 
marginal products of a or b).    In equation (12) the raw milk price is calculated as the value of Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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milk components.    Equations (13) and (14) are the market clearing conditions that the supply 
equals demand for each milk component. 
Totally differentiating equations (1)-(14), and converting to elasticity form yields a system 
of equations linear in percentage changes (we use the symbol E to denote percentage change): 
(15)  EM = εEWm 
(16)  Ea = EM 
(17)  Eb = EM 
(18)  EX1 = k1aEa1 + k1bEb1 
(19)  EX2 = k2aEa2 + k2bEb2 
(20)  EX1 = η11EP1 + η12EP2 + α11EZ1 + α12EZ2 
(21)  EX2 = η21EP1 + η22EP2 + α21EZ1 + α22EZ2 
















































(26)  EWm = vaEWa + vbEWb 
(27)  Ea = sa1Ea1 + (1-sa1)Ea2 
(28)  Eb = sb1Eb1 + (1-sb1)Eb2 
In the system, ε is the supply elasticity for raw milk; kia and kib (i = 1, 2) are the cost shares of a 
and b in total costs for product i; ηij is the elasticity of demand for product i with respect to the 
price of product j; αij is the elasticity of demand for product i with respect to advertising Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
 
6
expenditure for product j; σ1 and σ2 are the Allen elasticities of substitution between fat and snf 
in the production of fluid and manufactured dairy products; va and vb are the value shares of fat 
and snf in raw milk; and sa1 and sb1 are the shares of fat and snf, respectively, allocated to fluid 
milk products.    Under the assumption that fluid products and manufactured dairy products are 
substitutes in consumption, which we maintain throughout this paper, the signs of cross-price 
elasticities of demand are positive, and the cross-advertising elasticities of demand are 
negative.
1,2 
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1 Huang finds that some dairy products are substitutes, while others are complements.  The recent “Three-A-Day 
Dairy” advertising campaign seems to support the idea that some dairy products are substitutes. 
2 With two products, Basmann’s adding up condition implies that the cross-advertising elasticities are negative.  
However, Basmann’s condition only holds for a weakly separable group of products.  To the extent that advertising 
for a dairy product increases total expenditure on the group of all dairy products, the magnitudes and even signs of 
the cross-advertising elasticities will be affected. Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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or, more compactly as 
(30)  RY = D 
where R is a matrix of model parameters, Y a column vector of endogenous variables, and D a 
column vector of zeros, advertising intensities, and advertising elasticities of demand. 
2.2. Comparative Statics 
The model defines equilibrium proportional changes in dairy prices and quantities in 
response to exogenous changes in advertising expenditure (or intensity) for the two dairy 
products.  Setting  EZ2 = 0 and dividing all equations by EZ1, the system can be solved for the 
elasticities of dairy sector prices and quantities with respect to advertising expenditure for fluid 
milk products.    Of particular interest is the effect of advertising on the price of raw milk.    To 
simplify the analytical expressions of the elasticities, we make two assumptions that can easily 
be relaxed without affecting our main conclusions: 
•  Assumption 1: Fat and snf are the only inputs into the manufacture of dairy products, 
so that the sum of the cost shares of the components in each product equals one (kia + 
kib = 1, i = 1, 2). 
•  Assumption 2: the share of fat and snf used in fluid milk products are initially the same 
(sa1 = sb1 = s1). 
Under these assumptions, the elasticity of the raw milk price with respect to advertising 
for fluid milk is 
(31) 
() () 22 21 2 12 11 1
21 2 11 1
1
m
η η s η η s ε
α s α s
EZ
EW
+ − + −
+
= . 




Similarly, setting EZ1 = 0 and dividing all equations by EZ2 yields the effect of 
advertising for manufactured dairy products on dairy sector prices and quantities.    The elasticity 
of the raw milk price with respect to advertising for manufactured dairy products is 
(32)  () () 22 21 2 12 11 1
22 2 12 1
2
m
η η s η η s ε
α s α s
EZ
EW
+ − + −
+
= . 
These elasticities take into account the direct effects of advertising on the demand for the 
advertised and non-advertised products (own- and cross-advertising effects on demand), and the 
subsequent shift in the derived demand for raw milk.    In addition, these expressions take into 
account the reallocation of milk components towards the advertised product, and the equilibrium 
adjustments in dairy product prices. 
It follows from equation (15) that the elasticities of the quantity of raw milk sold with 
respect to advertising for fluid and manufactured dairy products are: 
(33)  ()
() () 22 21 2 12 11 1
21 2 11 1
1 η η s η η s ε
ε α s α s
EZ
EM
+ − + −
+
= , and 
(34)  ()
() () 22 21 2 12 11 1
22 2 12 1
2 η η s η η s ε
ε α s α s
EZ
EM
+ − + −
+
= . 
Further, the elasticities of raw milk revenue with respect to advertising for fluid and 
manufactured dairy products are: 
(35)  () ()
() () 22 21 2 12 11 1
21 2 11 1
1
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where Rm = MWm. 
Because dairy product markets are linked through the common use of milk components, 
the effect of advertising on the milk price is dependent on related markets even under the 
restrictive assumptions that there are no cross-price or cross-advertising effects on demand.    To 
illustrate, we set η12 = η12 = 0 and α12 = α21 = 0 in equations (31) and (32).    The resulting 
elasticities are 
(37) 
22 2 11 1
11 1
0 α α
0 η η 1
m


























In equation (37), the third term in the denominator, -s2η22 > 0 reduces the effect of fluid milk 
advertising on the price of raw milk.    As milk is re-allocated towards fluid milk products in 
response to increased demand for fluid milk, less milk is sold to the manufacturing market, 
thereby decreasing the milk revenue generated on the manufacturing market and decreasing the 
average price of milk.    The larger the share of milk initially allocated to manufacturing uses (the 
larger s2), or the more elastic is demand (the larger is η22 in absolute value), the less effective is 
fluid milk advertising at raising the price of raw milk.    Similarly, the second term in the 
denominator of equation (38), -s1η11 > 0, reduces the effectiveness of manufactured product 
advertising in raising the price of milk. Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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3. Optimal Advertising with Lump-sum Funding 
The comparative statics can be used to develop a rule for allocating dairy advertising 
expenditure.    Following Alston, Freebairn, and James, we define optimal advertising 
expenditure for each dairy product as that which maximizes producer surplus: 
(39) 




2 1 m Z Z )) Z , (Z TVC(M ) Z , (Z )M Z , (Z W
Z TVC TR PS
− − − =
− − =
 
where PS is the net producer surplus for dairy farmers, TR is the total milk revenue, and TVC is 
the total variable cost of producing milk.    The first order condition for optimal advertising 
intensity under lump-sum funding is 








This first order condition can be restated in proportional change form: 

















Substituting equations (31) and (32) into (42) yields the optimal advertising expenditures 
for fluid and manufactured milk products: 
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In order to illustrate the importance of the multi-market equilibrium effects of dairy 
product promotion, we also calculate what we term naïve advertising expenditures, which ignore 
the cross-market effects.    Setting the cross-price and cross-advertising elasticities of demand 
equal to zero (η12 = η12 = 0 and α12 = α21 = 0), and setting the own-price demand elasticity for the 
non-advertised product equal to zero (η22 = 0 in equation (43), and η11 = 0 in equation (44)), the 
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α s
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The naïve advertising expenditures ignore that dairy product markets are linked through demand 
and supply. 
Subtracting the optimal advertising expenditures from the naïve advertising expenditures 
yields the error that dairy farmers would make by choosing advertising intensities without regard 
for the multi-market equilibrium effects.    These are 
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Under reasonable conditions (|η12| < |η11| and |η21| < |η22|), equations (47) and (48) are Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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unambiguously positive.    That is, by ignoring the equilibrium multi-market effects of 
advertising, milk producers would tend to overspend on advertising.    The supply and demand 
linkages between dairy product markets tend to reduce the effectiveness of advertising as a tool 
to increase milk prices.    On the demand side, under the (reasonable) assumption that dairy 
products are substitutes, increased demand for one product comes at the expense of decreased 
demand for the other.    This is the “Beggar-Thy-Neighbor” effect of advertising that Alston, 
Freebairn, and James analyzed in the context of meat demand.    However, in the present context, 
where milk producers have an interest in both dairy product markets, advertising in one market 
has a “Beggar-Thy-Self” effect.    On the supply side, increased derived demand for milk is 
satisfied, in part, by a re-allocation of milk components from the non-advertised products.    Thus, 
the increase in the quantity of milk sold is smaller than the shift in demand for milk derived from 
the shift in demand for the advertised product. 
4. Conclusion and Directions for Further Research 
This paper develops a model of the dairy industry that incorporates the horizontal supply 
and demand relationships across dairy product markets, and links the product markets vertically 
to the implicit markets for milk components and the market for raw milk.    We use the model to 
derive analytical expressions for the effectiveness of dairy product advertising, and develop an 
advertising rule that maximizes milk producer surplus. Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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A key result is that producers would overspend on advertising if they ignore the 
horizontal linkages across dairy product markets. This is particularly important given that the 
extant literature typically considers only the direct (partial equilibrium) impact of advertising on 
the advertised market.    The econometric analyses that measure the shift in fluid milk and cheese 
demand as a result of fluid milk and cheese advertising tend to omit the cross-price and cross-
advertising effects in the estimated demand equations (Blisard et al.; Kaiser 1997 and 1999; 
Kaiser and Chung; Liu and Forker; Schmit and Kaiser).    Further, both the academic literature 
and dairy industry reports seem to equate increased demand for the advertised product into 
increased sales of the equivalent quantity of raw milk without recognizing the re-allocation of 
raw milk components, equilibrium adjustments in markets for non-advertised dairy products, and 
the implications for the price of raw milk. 
On-going work is extending the model and results presented here in several directions.   
Extension of the model to multiple products, while presenting problems for exposition, will 
allow for a more detailed picture of the interaction between product markets.    Further, we are 
revisiting the optimal advertising expenditure rule under per unit and ad valorem funding 
mechanisms (the current dairy check-off operates under a per unit tax).    Also interesting is the 
implication of non-competitive behavior along dairy market channels (Zhang and Sexton).   
Next, numerical simulation of the model will allow for a quantitative evaluation of the Beggar-Thy-Self Advertising 
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importance of the horizontal linkages across product markets for accurate measurement of the 
effects of advertising.    Moreover, further econometric work is needed to estimate the cross-
price and cross-advertising demand relationships across dairy product markets. 
Finally, while this paper explores an application to dairy markets, the economic concepts 
and implications are much more general.    Our model extends work by Alston, Freebairn, and 
James by linking markets for advertised products through supply as well as demand.    Other 
potential applications include commodities that are allocated to multiple downstream markets. 
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